Amendment Proposals by Members of the Convention
The question that comes to mind is why only in 2003? Why is there no secession clause prior to this date in the European treaties? And its answer is as interesting as it is elusive, as we will now discuss.
When the proposed text of the articles to be incorporated into the project of a Constitution for Europe was handed out to the over two hundred members (full and alternate) of the so-called Convention for the future of Europe i , recipients were encouraged to submit critical comment under the form of amendment proposals.
Later, the text they agreed to would serve as the Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) working base in order to achieve the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe. This circle of debate, broadcast in real time through the press, purposefully invited to attend all meetings, was further made available on the Internet around the clock.
The object of this paper is to examine the circumstance under which, for the first time within a project that is over fifty years old, a clause regarding the issue of withdrawal made its appearance: Article 46 (that during the course of the Convention was renumbered and became Article I-59) of the initial draft of the project of a Constitution for Europe stated:
PRAESIDIUM DRAFT
Article 59: Voluntary Withdrawal from the Union
1.
Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance to its own constitutional requirements.
2.
A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the Council of its intention. Once that notification has been given, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that state, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. The agreement shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament. Reaction to the secession clause was of three types. Some members did not object and willed the text of draft article 59 to be approved unaltered (1.1), others suggested that the text of the draft article should be altered (1.2) and, not surprisingly, a large number held that the text of the article on secession should be deleted altogether (1.3 & 1.4) (see Table 1 ).
A secession clause is welcome
The mere appearance in the draft Treaty of a secession clause indicates that evidently some number of members to the Convention -enough to carry weight with the Praesidium v -were in favour of both concept and wording of proposed article 59.
This explicitly runs contrary the direction taken through the Amsterdam-Nice axis that sought to discourage even the event of suspension of a Member State's rights taking place. Many thought that ultimately the Constitution might have provided for an expulsion mechanism, complementary to articles 7 TEU and 309 TEC. The latter establish sanctions for breach within national territory of status required to enter the Union:
(freedom, democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law). Through the possibility to expel a member, muscle vi would have been conferred to current article 10 TEC that calls for loyal countenance from Member States vis-à-vis the Union ( see Table III ), and might have discouraged further exasperation of an à la carte Europe born of multiple and selective opt-outs.
The very wording of article 59, voluntary withdrawal, suggests that readers look for a compulsive provision elsewhere in the text, but under the current structure of the draft it would be pointless. Article 59 of the Constitution, being in fact the only provision regarding exit, shifts initiative on this matter exclusively in favour of the secessionist State, and leaves the Union defenceless against moody behaviour of one of its components. Given that we are now twenty-five in number this is, to say the least, surprising.
The Text of draft article 59 should be altered
The second position expressed by members of the Convention -agreement as to the presence of a clause on withdrawal subject to alteration of the text proposed-is consistent with general principles of international law governing treaties: article 54 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties vii encourages specific provisions on exit to be established in each covenant coupled with a subsidiary rule based on consent of all parties involved.
Consensus on the clause was declared possible as long as withdrawal did not take place at will, and preferably intention to withdraw should be notified to the European Table IV ).
Possibility of withdrawal should be provided for in case of refusal to ratify a future revision of the treaty, partial withdrawal would not be admissible, and a mechanism of expulsion should also be provided for in the Constitution. Non-participation in the Council's decisions or discussion concerning the withdrawing (ex) Member State was generally sustained and some severe suggestions as to rules governing the procedure of re-joining the Union were presented (see table V). on the Law of (International) Treaties provides for this situation. It does so in a different manner and the Vienna solution is preferable, not so much for substantive reasons, but mainly because it provides a common answer applicable to all withdrawals from any international treaty.
Amendment proposals that followed this line of thinking failed, however to specify which article of the Vienna Convention they had in mind. Whether the intended reference was to Article 54 VC (see Table VI Vienna Convention constituted sufficient basis for termination of membership.
The Text of draft article 59 should simply be deleted
A number of members (see Table I , column 2) simply stated that the nature of the Union was incompatible with an exit clause -a circumstance that rendered the appearance of such a provision inconsistent with this European project. The position here defended considered EU Law treaties to be by nature not subject to withdrawal. EU literature on the termination of membership recalls that the unlimited duration of the Treaties (except for that of the ECSC, established for a period of fifty years, and that is no longer in force) is a strong argument in favour of the one-way border (Jacqué 2001). Conversely authors that have addressed this issue (many have chosen to ignore it) acknowledge that there is no justifiable impediment to a negotiated withdrawal should there be consensus of all parties. This is not due to principles of international law, this is due to the inevitability of this outcome should this come to pass (however exceptional and improbable it may be). If this were the case, then the established outer perimeter of Europe might evidently retract.
But this is not what the Constitution envisages.
Unanimity in the Council is now confined to cases where a State asks to join in opposition to situations in which a member State decides to leave. A voluntarist idea behind membership is enhanced and increasingly generates consensus on related descriptions of sovereignty as lent rather than lost (JONES 2001 and VITORINO 2004) x .
The very original assumption of otherwise authoritative doctrine (Jones 2001, p38) that already prior to the Constitution "the TEU (of 1993) 3.This Constitution shall cease to apply to the State in Question as from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, decides to extend this period.
4. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union, asks to re-join, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 57.
Whose consensus on a secession clause?
On the consensus issue the Praesidium was probably right, I recall no governmental objection to the Constitution as a whole on the grounds that it included a clause on withdrawal.
It is likely that all governments involved considered the implications of such a clause The historical explanation is that, on sovereignty, the Court had repeatedly been put one step ahead of the legislator, it was allowed to pre-set the pace of the intensity of integration because national judges and national citizens had turned first to the Court for answers. Judges and citizens sought answers on how to behave consistently with the gaps in current EU legislation. They relied on a Court, with a 'certain idea of Europe' to construe it in a manner convenient to European goals, if necessary, over and above (presumably) expendable national interests.
During the process associated with the Convention and post -NICE enlarged Europe, with detectably different intent, Governments and citizens sought primarily that new legislation would be construed in a manner as convenient as possible, to maximise national goals xv held compatible with a more general European interest. To obtain these results you do not turn to the judges in Luxembourg, you rely openly on nationally appointed expert members.
The Laeken Declaration has purposefully hinted that in order to adjust the Union to new challenges, the solution may be not only to entrust the Union with further encumbrances (i.e. more powers, more competence) but also to reassign taskscurrently dealt with at Union level-to the Member States. Prudence suggests caution.
For the time being, results of this volte-face are that once-allocated national sovereignty is now described as recoverable. Formally, this is the ultimate significance of codifying secession. 
Section III

When the UNION is not loyal to the Member States
Although legislative greed on the part of the institutions -beach of the principle of subsidiarity (current Article 5 TEC)-is amenable to judicial review before the ECJ, a decade of de facto impunity reigns over alleged breaches of this 1993 rule.
Institutional breaching of the Treaty (230 TEC) and unlawful inertia (232) are struck down by the ECJ and non-contractual liability of institutions and respective servants (288 TEC) is provided for.
Imminent rearrangement of competence partition between the Union and its Member States?
That an imminent rearrangement of competence partition between the Union and its Member States may take place is no novelty. In the past this would have meant that the Union was to be further encumbered with tasks. Many believe that in the near future some of the Union's current tasks are to be reclaimed by the Member States.
Is sovereignty recoverable an explicit challenge to the established principle that the lowest form of EU law takes precedence over the highest form of national law?
The Constitution codifies rules. Among them are the rule of primacy already established in EU jurisprudence, and an exit clause, to date unfamiliar to the EU system. Massive enlargement has made the legislator wary. Economic theory holds that when club models (here the Union) grow beyond their optimum (CORNES and SANDLER 1989) , we may expect to watch some members depart.
Codification of an enlarged Europe adopted an 'all cards on the table' approach.
Those who do not agree to submission of national rules, to exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ or to frequent implementation of decisions they do not agree with-as is the case under qualified majority voting-are free to leave. -No one will be forcefully excluded from the European project, but it is clear that consensus between the majority and an isolated contestant will not be sought for with the intensity known to negotiation under pre-constitutional rules.
European bliss has met with its reverse gear. Frontiers are thus rendered temporary, All European frontiers, old and new are rendered temporary. The external border is no longer fated to expand only, it may retreat, and the old and forgotten internal borders may be resurrected. Table IV )
No participation in negotiation of bilateral agreement
Heathcoat-Amory, Bonde, Seppanen, Zahadril all held that there should be participation in the discussion of the terms of the agreement but nonparticipation in the final vote.
Rejoining the Union, penalties
Mr Vastagh (proposed that this should only take place 5 years after entry into force of withdrawal), and Mr Alain Lamassoure suggested that re-entry should be forbidden to a secessionist Member State up to 20 years after entry into force of withdrawa.l Denunciation or withdrawal from a treaty containing no provision regarding termination, denunciation or withdrawal
1.
A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless a) it is established that parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal or b): a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2.
A party shall not give less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1. 
